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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal 
by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendant. Summary judgment presents only 
questions of law reviewable for correctness. Mills v. Brody, 929 
P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996). This issue was preserved for appeal 
in Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-
Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 66-71) 
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment presents 
only questions of law reviewable for correctness. Mills v. 
Brody, 929 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1996). This issue was preserved 
for appeal in Plaintiff's Response to Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 66-71) 
3. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that the 
statutes of limitation for enforcing both the Promissory Note and 
the Deed of Trust set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-23 and 57-
1-34 have not expired and that the Promissory Note and the Deed 
of Trust remain enforceable. This is a question of law 
reviewable for correctness. See, e.g., Horn v. Utah Dept. of 
Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95 (Utah App. 1998). This issue was 
preserved for appeal in Plaintiff's Response to Motion for 
Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 66-
71) 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-34. Sale of trust property by trustee 
- Foreclosure of trust deed - Limitation of actions. The 
trustee's sale of property under a trust deed shall be made, 
or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law 
for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be 
commenced, within the period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the 
trust deed. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23. Within six years - Mesne profits 
of real property - Instruments in writing. An action may be 
brought within six years: (1) for the mesne profits of real 
property; (2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability 
founded upon an instrument in writing, except those 
mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a order of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County. 
II. Statement of Facts 
1. Plaintiff is a co-owner of the real property located at 
4490 Highland Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 1 & 33) 
2. On or about August 26, 1986, plaintiff executed a 
Promissory Note and Deed of Trust in favor of U.S. Thrift & Loan. 
(R. 4-11) 
3. The Promissory Note and Deed of Trust were subsequently 
assigned to defendant. (R. 12) 
4. The Promissory Note provides for monthly payments in the 
amount of $1,320.92 commencing September 15, 1986. (R. 4) 
5. No payments have been made in accordance with the terms 
of the Promissory Note since in or around August 1993. (R. 2 & 
33) 
6. The Promissory Note authorizes acceleration of its 
entire unpaid balance upon an event of default, including non-
payment of the monthly payments. (R. 6) 
7. On or about February 27, 1995, defendant recorded a 
Notice of Default in which defendant exercised her option to 
accelerate the entire unpaid balance of the Promissory Note. (R. 
13-14) 
8. More than six years later, on November 21, 2001, 
defendant recorded a second Notice of Default in connection with 
her Promissory Note and Deed of Trust and on or about February 
25, 2002, defendant's Substitute Trustee gave notice of a 
Trustee's Sale of the property to be held April 10, 2002. (R. 15) 
9. On March 14, 2002, plaintiff filed his Complaint 
commencing the case at bar in which he alleged the foregoing 
facts and, based upon the expiration of the six-year statute of 
limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34 and 78-
12-23, prayed, inter alia, for the following relief: 
1. for a declaration that the Promissory Note and Deed 
of Trust at issue are unenforceable and do not constitute a 
lien or encumbrance upon the subject real property; and 
2. for an order quieting plaintiff's title to the 
property in plaintiff's name free and clear of any claim by 
defendant. 
(R. 1-15) 
10. On or about May 20, 2002, defendant filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R. 64-65) Plaintiff filed his Response to 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
on or about June 3, 2002 (R. 66-71), and defendant filed her 
Reply/Response memorandum on or about June 11, 2002. (R. 72-78) 
11. Apparently concluding that the six-year statute of 
limitations set forth in Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34 and 78-
12-23 is not applicable to this case, on July 29, 2002 the 
District Court issued its Order of Summary Judgment in which it 
granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, denied 
plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment, and dismissed this 
case with prejudice. (R. 85-86) 
12. Plaintiff timely filed his Notice of Appeal on August 
20, 2002. (R. 87-88) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As set forth above, on or about February 27, 1995, defendant 
recorded a Notice of Default in which she exercised her option to 
accelerate the entire unpaid balance of the Promissory Note at 
issue in this action. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34 
and 78-12-23, defendant had six years in which to either conduct 
a non-judicial trustee's sale of the property or commence an 
action to judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust. Because 
defendant's cause of action accrued on February 27, 1995, when 
she exercised her option to accelerate the entire unpaid balance 
of the Promissory Note at issue, defendant was required to 
conduct a trustee's sale on or before February 27, 2001. Having 
failed to do so, the statutes of limitation for enforcing both 
the Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust as set forth in Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-12-23 and 57-1-34 have expired and neither the 
Promissory Note nor the Deed of Trust is enforceable. 
ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that the statute of 
limitations for enforcing the Promissory Note and the Deed 
of Trust have not expired and that both instruments remain 
enforceable. 
On or about February 27, 1995, defendant recorded a Notice 
of Default in which she exercised her option to accelerate the 
entire unpaid balance of the Promissory Note at issue in this 
action. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 57-1-34 and 78-12-23, 
defendant had six years in which to either conduct a non-judicial 
trustee's sale of the property or commence an action to 
judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust. Section 57-1-34 provides 
as follows: 
The trustee's sale of property under a deed of trust shall 
be made, or an action to foreclose a trust deed as provided 
by law for the foreclosure of mortgages on real property 
shall be commenced, within the period prescribed by law for 
the commencement of an action on the obligation secured by 
the trust deed. 
In the case at bar, the "period prescribed by law for the 
commencement of an action on the obligation secured by the trust: 
deed" is set forth in section 78-12-23, U.C.A.: 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon 
an instrument in writing ... 
Because defendant's cause of action accrued on February 27, 
1995, when she exercised her option to accelerate the entire 
unpaid balance of the Promissory Note at issue, see, e.g., 51 Am 
Jur 2d, p. 588 § 166 (the statute of limitations begins to run 
upon the creditor's exercise of the option to accelerate the 
maturity of the debt), defendant was required to conduct a 
trustee's sale on or before February 27, 2001. Having failed to 
do so, the statutes of limitation for enforcing both the 
Promissory Note and the Deed of Trust as set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-12-23 and 57-1-34 have expired and neither the 
Promissory Note nor the Deed of Trust is enforceable. 
Defendant, however, argues that she "commenced" a non-
judicial foreclosure by the recording of a Notice of Default in 
February 1995 within the six-year period of limitations. (R. 44) 
Defendant misreads § 57-1-34. Section 57-1-34 recognizes and 
provides the limitations period for both methods of foreclosing a 
trust deed, non-judicial (see Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-28) and 
judicial (see UCA § 78-37-1). With respect to non-judicial 
foreclosures, § 57-1-34 provides that "[t]he trustee's sale of 
property under a deed of trust shall be made ... within [six 
years of acceleration of the trust deed note]." (Emphasis added). 
With respect to judicial foreclosures, § 57-1-34 provides that 
"[a]n action to foreclose a trust deed as provided by law for the 
foreclosure of mortgages on real property shall be commenced 
[within six years of acceleration]." (Emphasis added). 
Accordingly, fairly read, § 57-1-34 requires that a non-judicial 
foreclosure sale must take place within six years of acceleration 
and that an action for judicial foreclosure must be commenced 
within six years of acceleration. Defendant neither "made" a 
non-judicial foreclosure sale nor "commenced" a judicial 
foreclosure action within six-years of acceleration and her right 
to do so is now time barred. 
If the Court were to accept defendant's interpretation of 
§ 57-1-34, the filing of her February 1995 Notice of Default 
effectively tolled the statute of limitations forever. Having 
"commenced" her non-judicial foreclosure, there would be nothing 
to prevent defendant from noticing up her foreclosure sale in ten 
years, twenty years, or in the year 2050. That is clearly an 
absurd result unwarranted by the language of § 57-1-34. 
Defendant also asserts that "the intervening contract 
between the parties tolls the running of the statute." (R. 45) In 
support of this assertion, defendant alleges that "[i]n December 
of 1997, the Defendant and the Owners entered into the agreement 
which specifically provides that the issue of the Abank payments' 
would not be resolved until other matters set out in Part A of 
the agreement were disposed of first." (R.45) According to 
defendant, "[t]he agreement specifically tolls the running of the 
statute until Part A has been completed..." (R. 45) Again, 
defendant's argument is without merit. In the first place, 
defendant is not a party to the Settlement Agreement. (R.59-62) 
Nor does the settlement agreement say anything about tolling any 
statute of limitations, let alone "specifically" toll it as 
defendant would have the Court believe. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff respectfully requests that 
the trial court's Order of Summary Judgment be reversed and that 
this action be remanded to the trial court with instructions for 
the entry of summary jydgment in plaintiff's favor, 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DIVISION 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BAHMAN DADGARI, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NILOOFAR BAKHTI, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. 02-0902302 
JUDGE BURTON 
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and Plaintiffs cross-motion for 
summary judgment having been presented to the court along with Defendant's request for oral 
argument, and the court having reviewed the pleadings and materials supplied by the parties, 
and find the following: 
1. There is no substantial fact question which is in dispute. 
2. This case is a clear case where summary judgment is appropriate. 
3. Defendant's request for oral argument is denied. 
4. Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted. 
5. Plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is denied. 
6. This case is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of July, 2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
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